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Abstract
This paper incorporates costly voluntary acquisition of information a ` la Nikitin and Smith (2007) [Nikitin, M., Smith, R.T., 2007.
Information acquisition, coordination, and fundamentals in a ﬁnancial crisis. Journal of Banking and Finance, in press, doi:10.1016/
j.jbankﬁn.2007.04.031], in a framework similar to Allen and Gale (2000) [Allen, F., Gale, D., 2000. Financial contagion. Journal of Polit-
ical Economy 108, 1 33], without relying on any unexpected shock to model contagion. In this framework, contagion and ﬁnancial crises
are the result of information gathering by depositors, weak fundamentals and an incomplete market structure of banks. It also shows
how ﬁnancial systems entering a recession can aﬀect others with apparently stronger economic conditions (contagion). Finally, this is
the ﬁrst paper to investigate the eﬀectiveness of the Contingent Credit Line procedures, introduced by the IMF at the end of the nineties,
as a mechanism to prevent the propagation of crises.

JEL classiﬁcation: G21; D82
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‘‘We are giving countries a greater ﬁnancial incentive to
adopt crisis resistant policies by oﬀering those that do
Contingent Credit Lines to protect them from contagion
eﬀects’’
Stanley Fisher, First Deputy Managing Director of the
IMF (1994 2001), Policy Issues Forum, Washington DC,
April 28, 2001.
1. Introduction
Financial crises are costly and frequent events. During
the last twenty ﬁve years, more than two thirds of the Inter
national Monetary Fund (IMF) member countries have
suﬀered some kind of ﬁnancial troubles (see Lindgren
et al., 1996; Beim and Calomiris, 2001).
These ﬁnancial crises reﬂect the fact that the ﬁnancial
system, and especially the banking sector, not only can
amplify and transfer problems originated in other sectors
of the economy, but can also be a main driver of such crises
(for example, the ﬁnancial crises of Mexico 1994, Korea
1997 and Turkey 2000 had the banking sector weaknesses
at the core). Financial institutions are often linked to each
other through direct portfolio or capital connections that
are desirable ex ante, but during a crisis the failure of
one institution can have direct negative eﬀects on the other
institutions linked to it (see Rochet and Tirole, 1996; Agh
ion et al., 2000; Freixas and Parigi, 1998; Freixas et al.,
2000; Allen and Gale, 2000).
This paper provides a novel view on the interplay of sun
spots and fundamentals in the development of ﬁnancial cri
ses. In particular, it does not rely on any unexpected shock
to model contagion. In this framework, contagion and
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1ﬁnancial crises are the result of information gathering by
depositors, weak fundamentals and an incomplete market
structure of banks. It also shows how ﬁnancial systems
entering a recession can aﬀect others with apparently stron
ger economic conditions (contagion). Finally, this is the
ﬁrst paper to investigate the eﬀectiveness of the Contingent
Credit Line procedures, introduced by the IMF at the end
of the nineties, as a mechanism to prevent the propagation
of crises.
We model a four region economy, where the representa
tive bank of each region has access to an illiquid long term
investment project that allows depositors to increase their
expected welfare. Half of the banks are going to receive a
low return on their investment and will be called ‘‘bad
banks”, the other half will receive a high return on their
projects and will be called ‘‘good banks”. Additionally,
banks will maintain interbank linkages to reduce aggregate
uncertainty. Nevertheless, full linkages among banks are
not always possible and sometimes unstable structures
are set and contagion may occur.
We present three diﬀerent banking market structures.
First, a market where all banks maintain interbank link
ages (complete market structure). Second, the neighboring
case, where banks are just ﬁnancially connected to their
neighbors but indirectly to all the others. Finally, the island
case, where each bank keeps linkages with only one bank.
We will show that in the complete market structure the ﬁrst
best allocation is achieved. In the neighboring case, diﬀer
ent equilibria are possible: a veriﬁcation equilibrium with
partial runs (with and without contagion), a veriﬁcation
equilibrium with total runs, a full run equilibrium and a
no run equilibrium.
In the veriﬁcation equilibria depositors gather informa
tion and penalize ineﬃcient banks. In one of those equilib
ria, bank runs only take place in bad banks (partial bank
runs), although other banks might be aﬀected as well (con
tagion). In the second equilibrium, there is a global with
drawal from the banking system in a contagious fashion.
There is also a full run equilibrium, where depositors do
not gather information but withdraw in a pure panic
way, and one, characterized by no runs and no information
gathering. In the island case three diﬀerent equilibria are
possible: the veriﬁcation equilibrium, the full run equilib
rium, and the no run equilibrium. In the veriﬁcation equi
librium, bank runs are partial and there is no contagion.
Nevertheless, the expected utility is higher in the neighbor
ing case than in the island case.
The equilibria with crises of the model are fundamen
tals based and panic based at the same time. Bank runs
are related to fundamentals, although this does not mean
that bad fundamentals per se cause the run. Investors’
coordination on a particular equilibrium is triggered by a
self fulﬁlling prophecy. When the system is at rest, individ
uals do not ﬁnd it optimal to gather information and so the
model explains why there are periods in which individuals
do not modify their expectations on banks. However, if for
any reason they decide to invest in information gathering
they would penalize those states of nature in which banks
establish ineﬃcient links. This would cause the liquidation
of bad projects, but it might also generate contagion and
ﬁnancial crises when ﬁnancial linkages are very inaccurate.
Following, we deﬁne the role for a Central Bank as a
market completer. The mechanism we analyze is the one
similar to the Contingent Credit Line (CCL) of the IMF.
The idea of the CCL is to provide a precautionary line of
defense for members with sound policies, who are not at
risk of an external payments crisis of their own making,
but vulnerable to contagion eﬀects from capital account
crisis in other countries. We show that the CCL is a pow
erful mechanism to prevent ﬁnancial crises in environments
characterized by incomplete markets and distrustful
depositors.
Thelackofstrongevidenceofcontagiousbankfailuresin
the periods in which the Central Bank played an active role
as a lender of last resort does not disprove the possibility of
ﬁnancial contagion through the banking system. The recent
episode (September 2007) of depositors queuing at the
Northern Rock bank in the UK trying to withdraw their
money, has shown that it is possible to have distrustful
depositorseveninthepresence ofdepositinsurance,author
ities defending the solvency of the institution and a healthy
real economy. Additionally, banks in England and other
countries in Europe
2 attempting to get more liquidity is a
warning of the possibility of contagion. Our model is an
attempt to give some insights into this possibility, and in
explaining that a healthy interbank market is crucial in pre
venting contagious bank failures. It is obvious that more
work on anticipating and preventing such crises is needed,
and our paper is an attempt to go in such direction.
This paper goes in line with Allen and Gale (2000), Saez
and Shi (2004), Leitner (2005) and Castiglionesi and Bru
sco (2007) in the sense that banks maintain interbank link
ages but with the purpose to insure against negatively
correlated technological shocks (fundamentals). The pro
posed model incorporates voluntary costly acquisition of
information a ` la Nikitin and Smith (2007), but in our case
individuals are not allowed to maintain deposits in diﬀerent
banks, although this is done by banks themselves. This
allows us to explain contagion.
As in Allen and Gale (2000), we model contagion as an
equilibrium phenomenon. However, we do not require an
unexpected event to model contagion. Banks maintain
interbank linkages to insure against technological shocks
and this makes them fragile against information acquisition
by depositors. In such context, the ‘‘incompleteness” of the
interbank claims will determine the possibility of contagion.
Saez and Shi (2004) introduce the concept of a liquidity
pool, a claim structure where banks are indirectly con
nected, which guarantees liquidity in the presence of an
insolvent bank and impedes contagion. In our case the
2 For example, the Deutsche bank had bought 3.56% of Northern Rock,
consequently, the values of its shares were also aﬀected.
2Central Bank provides an eﬃcient solution to overcome
ﬁnancial contagion. As in Castiglionesi (2007), the Central
Bank plays the role of a market completer but when the
problems are due to fundamentals and not to liquidity
ones. Therefore, the results of the present paper indicate
that those institutions should be free of intervention by
local governments since their objective is to work as a
‘‘market completer” or global insurer avoiding the usual
political restrictions to capital mobility. Such institutions
reallocate resources from developed to underdeveloped
economies allowing the system to achieve the ﬁrst best
allocation.
The work by Leitner (2005), introduced the threat of
contagion as part of the optimal network design. The idea
is that when agents are not linked to one another, agents
who have high endowments have no incentive ex post to
help out those who have low endowments. Thus, some
positive net present value investments do not take place.
On the other hand, when agents are linked to one
another, agents with high endowments are willing to bail
out those with low endowments, since failure to do so
leads all projects to fail by contagion. On the contrary,
in the present paper, the linkages appear because banks
cannot anticipate the success of their projects, and there
fore the possibility of contagion is a cost that banks have
to assume.
The seminal contribution by Castiglionesi and Brusco
(2007) provides a model where diﬀerent regions are subject
to diﬀerent levels of moral hazard, and have negatively
correlated liquidity needs. Integrated ﬁnancial markets
increase expected social welfare, but only at the cost of
greater ﬁnancial instability. As a consequence, and con
trary to Allen and Gale’s ﬁnding, contagion is greater
the more interconnected banks are. They conclude that
banks establish links and accept the risk of contagion,
only when the risk is not too high. In this respect, it is
close to our results for incomplete markets. We ﬁnd that
the more incomplete the banking structure is, read the
island case, the less vulnerable to contagion it is. Never
theless, depositors prefer the neighboring case to the island
case.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: the basic
model is presented in Section 2. Section 3 describes the
social optimal allocation. Section 4, introduces ﬁnancial
intermediaries (banks), and analyzes diﬀerent market struc
tures and their respective equilibria. Sections 5 shows how
a Central Bank provides an eﬃcient solution to overcome
ﬁnancial contagion. Finally, Section 6 presents a numerical
example and Section 7 concludes.
2. The model
We consider a three date (t = 0, 1, 2) economy and one
single good. There are two types of assets: A liquid asset
that takes one unit of the good at date t and converts it into
one unit of the good at date t þ 1 (storage). An illiquid
asset that takes one unit of the good at date 0 and trans
forms it into R
H or R
L units of the good at date 2 depending
on the state of nature. It is assumed that 0 6 R
L < 1 < R
H





than one. If the illiquid technology is liquidated prema
turely at t ¼ 1, we obtain r, with 0 6 r < 1.
There are four regions in this economy. Each region
consists of a continuum of ex ante identical consumers
depositors with an endowment of one unit of the consump
tion good at t ¼ 0. They are subject at t ¼ 1 to a privately
observed uninsurable risk of being of either of two types.
Type 1 (or impatient) agents derive only utility from con
sumption in period one and type 2 (or patient) agents
derive only utility from consumption in period 2. In addi
tion, type 2 agents can privately store the good from
t ¼ 1t ot ¼ 2. Their utility function is as follows:
Uðc1;c2Þ¼
uðc1Þ with probability c ðType 1Þ;
uðc2Þ with probability ð1 cÞð Type 2Þ;
 
ð1Þ
where the utility function uð:Þ is deﬁned over non negative
levels of consumption, is strictly increasing, strictly
concave, twice continuously diﬀerentiable, and satisﬁes
Inada conditions. There is no aggregate uncertainty and
so the probability c represents the fraction of early consum
ers in the economy. Consumer’s type is his private
information.
There is also a continuum of identical banks in each
region, or a representative bank in each region. A bank is
a ﬁnancial institution which invests in the technology on
behalf of consumers and provides them with consumption
at t ¼ 1o rt ¼ 2. Each consumer deposits his endowment in
the bank at t ¼ 0, and in exchange he receives a demand
deposit contract. Competition among banks forces them
to oﬀer a contract that maximizes the expected utility of
the representative consumer. This contract pays a ﬁxed
amount at each date, and in the event that this is not pos
sible all available funds will be divided pro rata in propor
tion to claims (as in Allen and Gale (1998), we do not
assume a sequential service constraint). In particular, the
demand deposit contract gives the depositor the right to
withdraw either c1 at t ¼ 1o rc2ðRÞ at t ¼ 2. The second
period random return reﬂects the fact that having invested
in a random technology, the bank may not be able to make
its promised payment at date 2. In this sense the only risk
the depositors bear is that they will not be repaid their
money in the situation in which it is physically impossible
to repay them.
It is also assumed that banks in half of the regions will
obtain a high return on their investment project (expansion
banks, from now on good banks), and the other half a low
one (recession banks, from now on bad banks). Neither
bankers nor depositors know the type of their own banks
nor that of the other ones. Nevertheless, they know the dis
tribution of shocks in the whole economy. The information
is revealed to consumers depositors at t ¼ 2, although
they can obtain information at t ¼ 1 at a cost of e. This
3information cost can be understood as a monitoring cost.
Although information might be perfect and free, depositors
need time and other resources to process it.
3
Notice that if we consider all banks as a single one there
is no aggregate uncertainty concerning technology shocks,




H. Finally, it is assumed that depositors
cannot deposit in banks in more than one region.
3. Social optimum
The problem of the social planner is to maximize the
expected welfare of a representative consumer. We will
focus on the range of parameters under which the social
planner should never interrupt illiquid technology
investment at t ¼ 1
4 and even ineﬃcient projects should
be completed and resources on veriﬁcation should not be
spent. The social planner should use storage to provide




cuðc1Þþð 1 cÞuðc2Þ; ð2Þ
subject to x þ y 6 1; ð3Þ
cc1 6 y; ð4Þ
ð1 cÞc2 6 Rx; ð5Þ
x P 0; y P 0; c1 P 0; c2 P 0; ð6Þ
where y is the amount invested in storage, x is the
amount invested in the illiquid technology, c1 is the con
sumption of impatient consumers and c2 the consumption
of patient ones. Eq. (2) is the expected utility to be maxi
mized. Eq. (3) is the date 0 constraint which states that
all the resources should be used for storage or investment
and Eq. (4) the ﬁrst period one. It states that the amount
of storage should be enough to provide for consumption
of type 1 consumers. Similarly, Eq. (5) shows that the con
sumption of type 2 consumers comes from the illiquid
technology.
Optimality requires that the feasibility constraints are













Since uð Þ is strictly concave and satisﬁes the Inada condi
tions, the solution to problem (7) is unique and interior.












and once y  has been determined by Eq. (8) we can use










1 y  ðÞ
1 c
R; x
  ¼ 1 y
 : ð9Þ
Notice that (8) and (9) imply that u0ðc 
1Þ¼Ru0ðc 
2Þ; which in
turn implies u0ðc 
1Þ > u0ðc 
2Þ and c 
2 > c 
1. Thus, the ﬁrst best
allocation automatically satisﬁes the incentive constraint
c2 P c1; that is late consumers have no incentive to behave
as early consumers. We will call W
   ð y ;x ;c 
1;c 
2Þ the ﬁrst
best allocation, and U
  the expected utility achieved under
the ﬁrst best allocation.
4. Decentralized economy with banks
Decentralization of the social optimal allocation can be
achieved in the same way as in Allen and Gale (2000). Each




c if withdrawn in the ﬁrst period, provided that the
bank is solvent. In the second period all remaining assets
are liquidated and allocated among deposit holders on a
pro rata basis.
Each bank stores y  share of the period 0 deposit, and
invests the rest in the illiquid technology. The amount of
storage technology should be enough to just satisfy the
liquidity needs of impatient agents. Additionally, banks
are going to establish linkages ex ante, in order to insure
against the technology shock. Let zij be deﬁned as the loan
that bank j receives from bank i (by assumption zij ¼ zjiÞ.
Given that agents are risk averse, and that the bank type
may be revealed only in period 1, it is optimal that bank i





j 1;j6 izij across the banking system (where n is the number
of links each bank has). This interbank loans pays zijR
Hx if
kept until t = 2, when the bank is of a good type, and zijR
Lx
when the bank is of a bad type.
5 If liquidated at t =1 ,i t
will pay the same as other deposits withdrawn in the ﬁrst
period ðzijc1Þ. Recall that the interbank loans are
compensated simultaneously between banks, so if bank 1
decides to cancel its interbank loan at t ¼ 1, it will also have
to pay back its obligation with the other banks in that
period.
With four banks there are three types of ﬁnancial link
ages that are symmetrical: (1) the full linked case (complete
market structure), (2) the neighboring case, and (3) the
island case (the last two cases are examples of incomplete
market structures).
6 We assume that the structure of the
banking system is known at the very beginning but not
the type of each bank nor that of the depositor.
3 See Nikitin and Smith (2007) for a discussion of this
assumption.
4 Veriﬁcation is never socially optimal for values of e, such that,






. For a detailed derivation of this result, see
Nikitin and Smith (2007).
5 This structure of interbank loan payments facilitates savings in
monitoring costs while proﬁting from diversiﬁcation. It may also be
interpreted as banks’ shares in other banks in the system.
6 We use symmetrical allocations for simplicity of exposition. However,
similar results can be obtained with non-symmetrical linkages.
44.1. Complete market structure
In the complete market structure (full linked case), each
bank is linked to three other banks and therefore there is
only one possible state of nature which is represented in
Fig. 1.
From now on, G1 and G4 are going to be the good banks
and B2 and B3 the bad banks. A number 1 in the matrix
means that there is a linkage between those banks. In this
case, zi ¼ 3
4 and zij ¼ 1
4. In the presence of full linkages
among banks, the ﬁrst best equilibrium is achievable.

















subject to x þ y þ zj zi 6 1; ð11Þ


























2Þ P uðc1Þ; ð15Þ










2 represents second period consumption in a good
type bank and cB
2 second period consumption in a bad type
one. zj are total interbank loans received from other banks
in the system and obviously zj ¼ zi ¼
P4
j 1;j6 izij. Eq. (10) is
the expected utility to be maximized. Eq. (11) is the period
0 constraint and Eq. (12) the ﬁrst period one. Eqs. (13) and
(14) correspond to the second period constrains, in the case
of a bad bank and a good bank, respectively.
Given that each bank has an obligation equal to zje Rix
with the rest of the system and at the same time has the
right to receive zie Rjx from the other banks; the resources
available in the second period are given by the return of
the projects minus the obligations with the system plus
the right to receive from other banks: ½e Ri zje Ri þ zie Rj x,
where e Ri is the expected return from our technology, and
e Rj is the expected return from our neighbors. Finally, Eq.
(15) is the incentive compatibility constraint that guaran
tees that type 2 depositors do not have incentives to imitate
type 1 depositors.
It is straightforward to see that cB
2 ¼ cG





Hzij ¼R; and therefore we
have the same problem as in the social optimum given by
Eqs. (2) (9). Since c 
2 > c 
1, each agent has incentives to
respect his type, and the social optimal allocation is
attained. It is never optimal for consumers to spend
resources in obtaining information about the type of the
bank in the ﬁrst period. This result is summarized in the
following proposition.
Proposition 1. The ﬁrst best allocation W  is attainable in a
complete market structure.
4.2. The neighboring case
In the neighboring case, banks are ﬁnancially connected
to two other banks in the system forming a close group.
Given political, geographical and/or historical reasons,
some regions like A and C or B and D in Fig. 2 are not
directly connected although they are indirectly connected
through their neighbors.
Bankers and consumers depositors know this informa
tion from the very beginning, although they do not know
in which type of bank they are nor the type of their neigh
bor banks (they just know the structure of the game). Nev
ertheless, depositors can obtain this information at t ¼ 1a t
a cost of e.
We have three possible states of nature: One case where
a good bank is linked to two bad ones or a bad bank con
nected to two good ones, Fig. 3a, and two cases where a
good bank is connected to one good bank and one bad
one, Fig. 3b and c. All states are going to be equally prob
able, and are represented in Fig. 3.
However, those three states of nature can be separated
into two: that of Fig. 3a with probability 1
3 and those of
Fig. 3b and c with probability 2
3. In the neighboring case,
each bank will maintain total interbank loans of zi ¼ 2
3
and so zij ¼ 1
3. Now, consumers depositors are going to
solve the following problem:

































    
ð17Þ
subject to x þ y zi þ zj 6 1; ð18Þ

































































































x P 0; y P 0; zi ¼ zj ¼
X
zij; ð25Þ
c1N P 0; c
1





2H P 0; c
2
2H P 0; ð26Þ
where c1N is the consumption of impatient consumers,
c1
2L ðc1
2HÞ is the consumption of a patient depositor in a
bad (good) bank in state 1, and c2
2L ðc2
2HÞ is the consumption
of a patient depositor in a bad (good) bank in states 2 and 3.
Eq. (17) is the expected utility to be maximized. The ﬁrst
row of the objective function is the expected consumption
of type 1 agents and the expected consumption of type 2
agents in a bad bank. The second row represents the ex
pected consumption of type 2 agents in a good bank. Eq.
(18) is the period 0 constraint, where as before x is the
amount invested in storage, y the amount invested in the
illiquid asset and zj ðziÞ are total interbank loans received
from (given to) the neighbor banks. Eq. (19) is the ﬁrst per
iod constraint, and Eqs. (20) (23) are the second period
ones, that will depend on the bank type and the state. Eq.
(20) corresponds to the case where a depositor is at a bad
bank that is in states 2 or 3. The equation states that the
consumption oﬀered to patient depositors comes from the
bank’s project return ðR
LxÞ, less its obligations with the
banking system ðzjR
LxÞ plus the funds received from its
neighbors ðzijR
Hx þ zijR
LxÞ. Eq. (21) corresponds to the case
of a bad bank in state 1. The bad bank is connected to two
good banks. Similarly, Eq. (22) represents the contract of
fered to patient depositors by a good bank that is in states
2 or 3, while Eq. (23) is the one oﬀered by a good bank that
is in state 1. Finally, Eq. (24) is the incentive compatibility
constraint, which is expressed in expected terms, as the bank
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treat them separately because they will have diﬀerent con







be the optimal allocation oﬀered to consumers depositors
in an incomplete market structure of the neighboring case.
It will be shown that in this case the ﬁrst best allocation is
not achievable. In the neighboring case, a depositor would
ﬁnd it optimal ex post to liquidate his deposits prematurely
if the cost of obtaining information about their bank type
in the ﬁrst period is not too high, and provided other
depositors are also acquiring information.
4.2.1. Equilibria with liquidation and contagion in the
neighboring case
In this case, the possible equilibria are: a veriﬁcation
equilibrium with partial runs (with and without contagion),
a veriﬁcation equilibrium with total runs, a full run equilib
rium and a no run equilibrium. In the last two equilibria,
Fig. 3. States of nature in the neighboring case.
6depositors do not verify the type of banks. They either
withdraw from all banks or do not acquire information
and do not withdraw.
As shown below, if condition (27) is satisﬁed, when
depositors verify the type of banks, and they are in states
2 or 3, it is always optimal to withdraw their deposits from
bad banks. As a result, these banks have to liquidate their
technology and their interbank loans, and will be able to
pay a total amount of c c1N ¼
xrþyþzijc1N
1þzij < c1N.
7 On the other
hand, the good bank will have to liquidate part of its long
term asset in order to pay its interbank loans to the bad
bank; however it would not enter into a bank run as long
as d c2H ¼
RHð1 kÞx
ð1 cÞ > c1N, where k is the proportion of the
investment in the long term asset that has to be liquidated
in the ﬁrst date in the good bank in order to be able to
guarantee the promised consumption of c1N.
8
Nevertheless, if second period consumption in the good
bank is less than the promised one, that is, d c2H < cH
2 , the
good bank is aﬀected by contagion and is contractually
bankrupt. This is the case of a veriﬁcation equilibrium with
partial bank runs and contagion. There is contagion
because the expansion bank, even if it does not experience
a run, it cannot pay its promised consumption to its late
consumers.
9
Another interesting case is the one of state 1, where a
good bank is connected to two bad banks. In this state,
depositors of good banks will generate a ﬁnancial crisis
due to the fundamentals of bad banks. As c1N > cL
2 patient
depositors have incentives to withdraw from the good
banks (note that c2
2L ¼ c1
2H ¼ cL
2Þ. On the other hand, if
we deﬁne c c2L ¼
xRLð1 kÞ
ð1 cÞ , where as before k is the proportion
of the investment in the long term asset that has to be liq
uidated in the ﬁrst date in the bad bank in order to be able
to guarantee a consumption of c1N, then as c c2L < c1N then
patient depositors will also withdraw from bad banks. The
curiosity is that if patient depositors of good banks wait
until t = 2, they would receive less than depositors from
bad banks. In this veriﬁcation equilibrium with total bank
runs all depositors receive xr þ y.
10
The following propositions describe conditions for the
existence of the diﬀerent equilibria. All proofs are con
tained in Appendix A.
Proposition 2. In states 2 and 3, there is a veriﬁcation
equilibrium in which only bad banks are liquidated and good
banks can either be affected or not by contagion, whereas in
state 1, all depositors will withdraw their deposits generating
a ﬁnancial crisis based on fundamentals.
The previous statement is going to be true when the fol
lowing conditions are satisﬁed:
c1N P cL
2; ð27Þ






uðxr þ y eÞþ
1
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uðxr þ y eÞþ
1
3









uðxr þ yÞ: ð30Þ
Eq. (27) indicates that the lowest possible consumption in
the second period is smaller than consumption promised
to impatient depositors. As a result it is optimal for patient
depositors of bad banks in states 2 and 3 to withdraw their
deposits in the ﬁrst period (as well as for patient depositors
of good banks in state 1). Eq. (28) guarantees that good
banks will have enough resources to compensate patient
depositors and avoid a bank run in states 2 and 3.
Finally, Eqs. (29) and (30) state that if all other deposi
tors are playing the veriﬁcation equilibrium it is optimal to
play it.
11
Additionally, we still have the traditional equilibria,
which are given in the following proposition:
Proposition 3. The no run and the full run are also Nash

























c1N P r: ð33Þ
Eqs. (31) and (32) guarantee that an agent has no incentive
to deviate in the no run equilibrium. Eq. (31) is the incen
tive compatibility constraint while Eq. (32) guarantees that
the beneﬁt obtained by verifying and withdrawing when the
outcome is ineﬃcient, is lower than the expected utility
achieved in the no run equilibrium. Finally, Eq. (33) guar
antees the existence of the full run equilibrium. This condi
tion says that if all depositors withdraw in the ﬁrst period,
neither good nor bad banks have enough resources to pay
them the promised amount of c1N.
7 Notice that d c1N ¼
xrþyþzijc1Nþzijc c1N
1þzi , where the numerator represents
assets available given by the liquidation of the long term asset, the storage
technology and liquidation of interbank loans with the good and the bad
bank respectively. The liabilities of the bank are given by the denominator
of the equation. Therefore, d c1N ¼
xrþyþzijc1N
1þzij .
8 With k ¼
½C1NðcþzijÞ y zij c C1N  
rx .
9 This veriﬁcation equilibrium with contagion will occur whenever k is
greater than a value k
 , for which d c2H ¼ cH




thank the reviewer for pointing out this possibility.
10 This equilibrium takes place because of the linkages that good banks
have established ex ante, due to the uncertainty about the future return.
Finally, those linkages result in worse than being alone. This can be the
case of depositors of banks in developed countries disapproving of their
banks investing in other banks in underdeveloped countries.
11 For a better description of these two equations, see Appendix A.
74.3. The island case
In the island case, each bank is ﬁnancially connected to
just one bank in the system. As a consequence, we also
have three possible states: One case where a good bank is
connected to the other good and the bad bank to the other
bad one, Fig. 4a and two cases where a good bank is linked
to a bad bank, Fig. 4b and c. Each state is going to be
equally probable.
In this case, banks will maintain total interbank loans of
zi ¼ 1
2 and so zj ¼ 1
2.


































    
ð34Þ
subject to x þ y zi þ zj 6 1; ð35Þ
















































































2L P 0; c
A
2H P 0; c
B
2H P 0; ð42Þ
where c1I is the consumption of an impatient consumer,
cA
2L ðcA
2HÞ is the consumption of a patient depositor of a
bad (good) bank in state I, and cB
2L ðcB
2HÞ is the consump
tion of a patient depositor of a bad (good) bank in states
II and III. Eq. (34) is the expected utility to be maximized.
The ﬁrst row of the objective function is the consumption
of type 1 agents and the expected consumption of type 2
agents in a bad bank. The second row represents the ex
pected consumption of type 2 agents in a good bank. Eq.
(35) is the period 0 constraint, where x is the amount in
vested in storage, y the amount invested in the illiquid asset
and zj ðziÞ are total interbank loans received from (given
to) the partner bank. Eq. (36) is the ﬁrst period constraint,
and Eqs. (37) (40) are the second period ones, that will de
pend on the bank type and the state. Eq. (37) corresponds
to the case of a bad bank in state I. It states that the con
sumption of patient depositors comes from the banks’s re
turn ðR
LxÞ, less its obligation with the system ðzjR
LxÞ, and
from the return obtained from the other bank ðzijR
LxÞ.
Eq. (38) corresponds to the case of a bad bank in states
II and III. Similarly, Eq. (39) refers to the case of a good
bank in state I and Eq. (40) represents the case of a good
bank in states II and III. Finally, Eq. (41) is the incentive
compatibility constraint, which is expressed in expected
terms, as the bank ignores both its return and that of its
neighbors.
Let






be the optimal allocation oﬀered to consumers depositors
in an incomplete market structure of the island case. It will
be shown that the equilibrium achieved in the island case is
worse than the ﬁrst best allocation achieved in the complete
market structure and also worse than the second best of
fered in the neighboring case.
4.3.1. Equilibria with liquidation in the island case
In the island case, three diﬀerent equilibria are possible:
a veriﬁcation equilibrium (with partial bank runs), a full
run equilibrium and a no run equilibrium.
Fig. 4. States of nature in the island case.
8In the veriﬁcation equilibrium, depositors verify the type
of banks, and withdraw from bad ones. As a result, in
state I, impatient and patient depositors of bad banks will
receive xr þ y. Impatient depositors of good banks
will receive b c1I; while patient depositors of good banks will
receive b cA
2H. In the other two cases (states II and III), impa
tient depositors will receive ^ c1I, while patient depositors
will receive ^ cB
2H ¼ ^ cB
2L ¼ ^ cT
2.
The diﬀerence with the veriﬁcation equilibrium of the
neighboring case is that NO contagion occurs.
The following propositions describe conditions for the
existence of the diﬀerent equilibria. All proofs are con
tained in Appendix A.
Proposition 4. In state I of the Island case, there is a
veriﬁcation equilibrium where depositors of bad banks
withdraw their deposit in the ﬁrst period due to fundamentals
and depositors of good banks wait until t = 2 and obtain the
maximum return, if the following conditions are satisﬁed:

















































uðxr þ yÞ: ð45Þ
Eq. (43) guarantees that it is optimal for depositors of
bad banks to withdraw their deposits in the ﬁrst period.
Eqs. (44) and (45) ensure that if all agents play the
veriﬁcation equilibrium, it is not optimal for any agent to
deviate.
As in the neighboring case, we have the traditional equi
libria, which are summarized in the proposition below:
Proposition 5. In the island case, the no run and the full run














































^ c1I P r: ð48Þ
Eqs. (46) and (47) guarantee that an agent has no incen
tive to deviate in the no run equilibrium. Eq. (46) is the
incentive compatibility constraint while Eq. (47) guaran
tees that the beneﬁt obtained by verifying and withdraw
ing when the outcome is ineﬃcient, is lower that the
expected utility achieved in the no run equilibrium. Final
ly, Eq. (48) guarantees the existence of the full run equi
librium. This is the condition that guarantees that if all
depositors withdraw in the ﬁrst period, neither good nor
bad banks have enough resources to pay them the prom
ised amount of b c1I.
5. The role for a Central Bank
As a consequence of the rapid spread of the Asian crisis
of 1997 1998 to the global ﬁnancial markets, the IMF
introduced the Contingent Credit Lines (CCL) in 1999.
The idea of the CCL was to provide a precautionary line
of defense for members with sound policies, who were
not at risk of an external payments crisis of their own mak
ing, but were vulnerable to contagion eﬀects from capital
account crisis in other countries. The package allowed
those countries that met certain eligibility criteria, to draw
on a pre speciﬁed amount of resources if hit by a ﬁnancial
crisis due to factors outside of the member’s control.
We have seen in the previous sections that in the pres
ence of an incomplete market structure of the neighboring
case, banks are subject to the risk of contagion and ﬁnan
cial crises. In this section, we will show that there is a role
for a Central Bank to complete markets. In our setting, the
Central Bank will require reserves from banks at date 0 and
will redistribute such reserves into the banking system in
the form of credit lines to banks. With the Central Bank,
the ﬁrst best allocation is achieved when the ﬁnancial sys
tem is incomplete.
12
The World Bank and other international institutions
like the IMF reallocate resources during ﬁnancial crises.
In what follows, we show that such behavior can be
socially optimal. The Central Bank is going to require
reserves of T i ¼ 1
4
  
from each bank which is going to main
tain in the system T j ¼ 1
4
  
in order to allow banks to max
imize depositors’ expected utility.
These reserves work in the same way as interbank loans,
banks will have to pay an amount to the Central Bank, that
is contingent on the resources available in the second
period, that is, T j½e Ri zje Ri þ zie Rj x (where e Ri is the
expected return from our technology, and e Rj is the
expected return from our neighbor banks). Additionally,
banks will receive a payment in the form of a ‘‘Contingent
Credit Line” from the Central Bank that will restore the
social optimal allocation. The intuition says that the Cen
tral Bank will complete markets, and so bad banks that
are in states 2 and 3 and good banks in state 1 will receive
T iR
Hx, which is more than what they pay ðT iR




Lzij xÞ. On the other hand, good
banks that are in states 2 and 3, and bad banks of state 1
will receive T iR
Lx, which is less than what they pay
ðT iR





12 It should be noted that in the island case, there is no role for a Central
Bank, as in the bad state of nature there is no contagion and that is why
bad banks are penalized and good banks are not aﬀected.
13 Recall that patient depositors of bad banks in states 2 and 3 obtained




2Þ. Similarly, patient depositors of good banks in states 2




9The problem to be maximized, when a Central Bank is

































    
ð49Þ
subject to x þ y zi þ zj T i þ T j 6 1; ð50Þ


































































2L P 0; c
1
2H P 0; c
2
2H P 0; ð57Þ
zi ¼
X




Eq. (49) is equal to Eq. (17), the objective function in the
neighboring case. Eq. (50) is the budget constraint, that
is equal to Eq. (18) of the neighboring case, except that it
considers reserves required and received from the Central
Bank. Eq. ( 51) is the ﬁrst period constraint which is also
identical to Eq. (19) in the neighboring case and ﬁnally,
Eqs. (52) (55) are the second period constraints, which
take into account amounts paid to and received from the
Central Bank, respectively.
Eq. (52) corresponds to the case where a depositor is at a
bad bank that is in states 2 or 3. Recall that the bad bank is
connected to one good bank and to one bad one. In this
case, the bank pays a proportion T jx of the resources avail








On the other hand, it receives the amount T ixR
H as a con
tingent credit line. The rest of the equations have a similar
interpretation. Eq. (53) corresponds to the case of a bad
bank in state 1. Eq. (54) represents the contract oﬀered
to patient depositors by a good bank that is in states 2 or
3, while Eq. (55) is the one oﬀered by a good bank that
is in state 1. Finally, Eq. (56) is the incentive compatibility
constraint, which is identical to Eq. (24) of the neighboring
case.
Under these conditions, it is easy to show that the ﬁrst
best allocation is achieved. Notice that c2
2L ¼ c1
2H ¼
f½RLð1 zjÞþRHzijþRLzij ð1 TjÞþTiRHgx
1 c ¼ Rx
1 c. Similarly, c1
2L ¼ c2
2H ¼
f½RLð1 zjÞþRHzijþRHzij ð1 TjÞþTiRLgx
1 c ¼ Rx
1 c, and so the problem is
reduced to the social planner’s problem analyzed in Section
3.
The idea is that the Central Bank guarantees the optimal
level of risk sharing and therefore avoids contagion and
ﬁnancial crises. Those international institutions work as
international market insurers (or market completers), since
it is frequent to observe that although some ﬁnancial sys
tems are not connected due to political or economic rea
sons, they can be indirectly connected through those
international institutions in order to avoid ﬁnancial crises
and increase social welfare.
It should be noted that in practice the behavior of the
IMF is aﬀected by the fear of moral hazard problems. This
implies that the CCL would be extended in state 1, or in
states 2 and 3, but when there is contagion ðk > k
 Þ.I n
our setting moral hazard is absent and so it is welfare supe
rior to avoid information gathering and to prevent every
ﬁnancial crisis equilibria.
6. Numerical example
A numerical example nicely illustrates the results pre
sented inthis paper.In theexamplethat follows,preferences
and parameters values are displayed in Table 1; while the
results from the optimization problem appear in Table 2,
columns 1 4, for the complete market structure, the neigh
boring case, the island case and autarky, respectively. For
these values, all the conditions for the existence of the diﬀer
ent equilibria in the neighboring case are satisﬁed for any
e 2ð 0:058;0:06Þ. Similarly, all the conditions for the exis
tence of the diﬀerent equilibria in the island cased are satis
ﬁed for any e 2ð 0:126;0:151Þ. Note that for these values
veriﬁcation is never socially optimal, as e  ¼ 0:023.
Additionally,weobtainthatinstates2and3oftheneigh
boring case there is a veriﬁcation equilibrium with partial
bank runs and contagion. There is contagion because the
expansionbank,evenifitdoesnotexperiencearun,itcannot
pay its promised consumption to its late consumers. Recall
that this equilibrium takes place whenever the proportion
ofthe long term asset that isliquidated att =1( k),is greater
than a threshold level of k
 , which guarantees that second
period consumption is equal to the promised one. In the
example, k ¼ 0:25 > k
  ¼ 0:235, and so we have a veriﬁca
tion equilibrium with partial runs and contagion (Table 1).
Obviously,the highest expectedutility corresponds tothe
completemarketstructurewheretheﬁrstbestisachievedfol
lowed by the neighboring and the island cases respectively.
Theoccurrenceofcontagiondoesnotimpedethatthealloca
tionreachedintheneighboringcaseishigherthanthatofthe
island case. Therefore, contagion and crisis are the conse
quences of the higher expected utility that can be reached
when a complete market structure is not a possible one.
7. Conclusion
The paper incorporates costly voluntary acquisition of
information a ` la Nikitin and Smith (2007), in a framework
10similar to Allen and Gale (2000). This allows us to model
the relationship between shocks to fundamentals and con
tagion, without relying on any unexpected shock to model
contagion.
In the paper, depositors can modify their behavior due
to the use of costly information. When the system is at rest,
individuals do not ﬁnd it optimal to gather information
and so our model explains why there are periods in which
individuals do not modify their expectations on banks.
However, if for any reason they decide to invest in informa
tion gathering they would penalize those states of nature in
which banks establish ineﬃcient links. This would cause
the liquidation of bad projects, but it might also generate
contagion and ﬁnancial crises when ﬁnancial linkages are
very inaccurate.
In the neighboring case, two possible equilibria with
contagion, due to fundamentals, are possible. In the ﬁrst
one, bad banks fail and good banks are aﬀected by conta
gion. Even though good banks are not aﬀected by bank
runs and can meet their obligations with impatient depos
itors, the malfunctioning of the interbank payment system
obliges them to liquidate part of their long term technol
ogy. As a result, good banks go bankrupt in the second
period. In the second equilibrium, depositors in good
banks withdraw their deposits generating a collapse of
the entire banking system. These equilibria have very low
probability but can explain the occurrence of some interna
tional ﬁnancial crises.
From our analysis, it can be concluded that a complete
market structure is resilient to shocks in fundamentals. For
the case of incomplete market structures, we ﬁnd that the
more incomplete the banking structure is, read the island
case, the less vulnerable to contagion it is. Nevertheless,
depositors prefer the neighboring case to the island case.
In this respect our results are similar to those of Castiglio
nesi and Brusco (2007). They ﬁnd that banks establish links
and accept the risk of contagion only when the risk is not
too big.
Finally, we analyze the existence of international institu
tions like the World Bank and the IMF. In our model,
those institutions appear as an optimal solution when polit
ical restrictions impede perfect capital ﬂows. We present
the importance of some mechanisms like the Contingent
Credit Line (CCL) of the IMF to eradicate crises and pre
vent contagion.
It should be noted that in our setting moral hazard is
absent and so it is welfare superior to avoid information
gathering and to prevent every ﬁnancial crisis equilibrium.
An avenue for future research would be to analyze the opti
mality of those institutions in the presence of moral hazard
or aggregate uncertainty.
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Proof of Proposition 2. In states 2 and 3, depositors of bad
banks receive cL
2, which is smaller than c1N (Eq. (27)). If
depositors acquire information and ﬁnd out that they are in
those states, they will withdraw their deposits in the ﬁrst
year. Eq. (28) guarantees that patient depositors of good
banks will still ﬁnd it beneﬁcial to wait until t = 2, and so
there are no bank runs. On the other hand, if depositors
gather information and realize that they are in state 1, they
would behave as impatient consumers and will generate a
ﬁnancial crisis. Eq. (27) ensures that patient depositors of




2Þ, but since bad banks do not have
enough resources to compensate its interbank loans,
patient depositors of bad banks will also withdraw their








x ¼ 0:5 x ¼ 0:5 x ¼ 0:5 x ¼ 0:514
y ¼ 0:5 y ¼ 0:5 y ¼ 0:5 y ¼ 0:486
c1 ¼ 1 c1N ¼ 1 c1I ¼ 1 c1IMP ¼ 0:973
c2 ¼ 1:1 c2
2L ¼ 0:9 cA
2L ¼ 0:5 c2H ¼ 1:7458
EU ¼ 0:0476 c1
2L ¼ 1:3 cB
2L ¼ 1:1 c2L ¼ 0:513
c1
2H ¼ 0:9 cA
2H ¼ 1:7 EU ¼ 0:041
c2
2H ¼ 1:3 cB
2H ¼ 1:1
EU ¼ 0:039 EU ¼ 0:0182
ðxr þ yÞ¼0:75 ðxr þ yÞ¼0:75
d c1N ¼ 0 8125
d c2H ¼ 1:275
c c2L ¼ 0:375
Table 1
Values of the parameters
uðc1Þ uðc2Þ RH RL r c R k kk
  e 
Lnðc1 þ kÞ Lnðc2 þ kÞ 1.7 0.5 0.5 0.5 1.1 0.000001 0.25 0.235 0.023
11Finally, Eqs. (29) and (30) ensure that if all other agents
are playing the veriﬁcation equilibrium, it is optimal to
play it. Eq. (29) states that the expected utility an agent
achieves by acquiring information and withdrawing from
ineﬃcient banks is higher than that obtained by doing
nothing, and waiting until the second year. Eq. (30) ensures
that an indiscriminate withdrawal is neither optimal. h
Proof of Proposition 3. Eqs. (31) and (32) ensure that
patient depositors do not have an incentive to deviate in
the no-run equilibrium. Eq. (31) is the incentive compatibil-

























where the left hand side is the expected utility of patient
depositors and the right hand side is the expected utility
of impatient ones. We obtain the result of the formula by








Eq. (32) guarantees that the expected utility of patient
depositors is greater than the expected utility obtained by
the policy of acquiring information and withdrawing when
the consumption oﬀered for being patient is low.
Finally, Eq. (33) guarantees the existence of the full-run
equilibrium. This is the condition that guarantees that if all
depositors withdraw in the ﬁrst period, neither good nor
bad banks have enough resources to pay them the
promised amount of c1N.
Second, consider conditions for the existence of equi-
libria in the Incomplete Market Structure of the island
case. h
Proof of Proposition 4. In state I, if depositors from bad
banks obtain information and realize that they are in that
state, they will receive b cA
2L which is less than b c1I, so they will
behave as impatient depositors. As a consequence, bad
banks are liquidated and pay xr þ y to all depositors. Good
banks are not aﬀected by the shock since they do not have
links with bad banks, and so they will pay depositors as
promised in the demand deposit contract.
Eqs. (44) and (45) guarantee that if all agents play the
veriﬁcation equilibrium, it is not optimal for any agent to
deviate. Eq. (44) states that the expected utility an agent
achieves by acquiring information and withdrawing from
ineﬃcient banks is higher than that obtained by doing
nothing, and waiting until the second year. Eq. (45) ensures
that an indiscriminate withdrawal is neither optimal. h
Proof of Proposition 5. Eqs. (46) and (47) guarantee that if
all other agents do not gather information (play the no-run
equilibrium) it is not optimal for any agent to deviate.






























where the left hand side is the expected utility of patient
depositors and the right hand side is the expected utility
of impatient ones. We make use of the fact that ^ cB
2L ¼
^ cB
2H ¼ ^ cT
2.
Eq. (47) guarantees that the expected utility of patient
depositors is greater than the expected utility obtained by
the policy of acquiring information and withdrawing when
the consumption oﬀered for being patient is low.
Finally, Eq. (48) guarantees the existence of the full-run
equilibrium. This is the condition that guarantees that if all
depositors withdraw in the ﬁrst period, neither good nor
bad banks have enough resources to pay them the
promised amount of b c1N. h
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